Every year, our team of specialist editors draws up a list of humanitarian crises to watch. In 2026, as ever, there are strong cases for including several more dynamic settings, from the Sahel to Iran, from Yemen to Myanmar. This is just a selection:
Venezuela: Between a Rock and a Hard place
The US military assault inside Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro on 3 January came as a shock and a disturbing reminder of the kind of US interventionism in Latin America most hoped had been consigned to history.
Even if millions of Venezuelans initially celebrated the ousting of Maduro – an authoritarian leader who plunged his country into a severe humanitarian crisis through years of mismanagement, corruption, and repression – concerns about what comes next are rising.
Hours after the attack, President Donald Trump said the US would “run” Venezuela until a “safe, proper, and judicious transition” can be ensured, but gave no details other than asserting that Vice-president (now President) Delcy Rodríguez had agreed to support the US. Rodríguez initially rebuffed that notion, but then adopted a more conciliatory tone, fuelling speculation she had secretly struck a deal with the Trump administration.
What is clear is that the most direct US intervention since the invasion of Panama in 1989 has more to do with oil than with tackling the flow of illegal drugs or the freedom of Venezuelans.
The immediate signs for their future are not good. If anything, the (seemingly now US-backed) regime of Rodríguez has been intensifying the repression, using armed militias known as colectivos to stifle dissent, patrolling on motorbikes and operating checkpoints to interrogate people and search their mobile phones. This crackdown extended to the media, with the detention of at least 14 (mostly international) journalists and media workers.
In Caracas, anxious residents have been rushing to stock up on provisions, a difficult endeavour in a country where inflation runs at nearly 500% and 78.4% of the population lives in poverty.
Anticipating a new exodus of refugees (almost 8 million Venezuelans, a quarter of the entire population, have already left since 2014) and a deepening humanitarian crisis, Colombia declared an “economic state of emergency” at its border with Venezuela, preventively deploying 30,000 troops. Bogota’s major concern is the return of elements of the National Liberation Army (ELN) – Colombia’s largest rebel group – that found a safe haven in Venezuela under Maduro.
The risk of more violence looms in Venezuela as well, as Trump threatened further military action if Chavista hardliners don’t bend to US control. He also dismissed the notion that the opposition could play any leading role in Venezuela’s near future and that new elections might come soon.
Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, whose chosen candidate is widely credited with defeating Maduro by a landslide in 2024 presidential elections, maintains that her coalition should be in charge, but Trump is so far refusing to back her.
Across the region, leaders have condemned the US strike, fearing it might open up a new era of increased instability and US interventionism in Latin America, with that anxiety most keenly felt in Cuba, where the regime fears it may already be in Trump’s sights.
Sudan: No end in Sight to World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
There is little sign of any improvement in Sudan as the war between the national army (SAF) and the paramilitary-turned-rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – along with the many armed groups aligned with each side – nears three years. Famine conditions have spread, and 11.5 million people are displaced, including more than four million who have escaped to neighbouring countries.
Current peace efforts are being driven by the Quad group, which includes the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – but these mediators are deeply implicated in what is also a geopolitical war. The UAE has provided extensive backing to the RSF, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia have supported the SAF.
The army has repeatedly rejected truce proposals, while the RSF accepts them on paper yet continues to massacre civilians on the ground – as it did in El Fasher, where thousands, if not tens of thousands of Sudanese were slaughtered in late October.
The proliferation of rebel groups, militias, and civilian defence forces aligned with both camps only compounds the chaos of the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.
For now, Sudan is de facto partitioned. The SAF has consolidated control over eastern and central Sudan, retaking Khartoum last year and several other cities previously held by the RSF. The RSF, meanwhile, has cemented its grip over Darfur, entrenching its dominance in the west. Both sides have declared rival governments and are improving their arsenals as deadly fighting shifts toward the Kordofan region between the two zones of control.
Palestine: A Double Occupation and the Suffocation of Hope
The international legal consensus is overwhelming: Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip, and its illegal occupation of the Palestinian Territories must end.
Despite this, Israel continues to violate the ceasefire concluded last October at will and has intensified its seizure of Palestinian land and the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank.
President Trump’s 20-point peace plan contains an ambiguous, non-committal reference to a pathway to Palestinians’ self-determination and statehood – something Israel categorically rejects. In reality, the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the plan has created a veil of international legitimacy for what is essentially a double occupation of Gaza, with the US now assuming the role of colonial overseer.
Whether any country will sign up for the International Stabilization Force that is supposed to deploy to Gaza to pave the way for the disarmament of Hamas, withdrawal of Israeli forces, and eventual Palestinian self-rule is yet to be seen.
Meanwhile, Israel is digging in, and the enclave continues to be a testing ground for the manipulation of humanitarian aid for political and military ends, as illustrated by the late December suspension of more than two dozen organisations for (according to the Israeli government) failing to comply with new registration rules.
Israeli policies in the West Bank have not reduced life quite to the same state of bare survival as in Gaza, but communities are being pushed off of their land, Israeli army and settler violence is surging, the economy is being suffocated, and people’s horizon of possibility ends at the wall of the next Israeli settlement, bypass road, or separation barrier. A new UN report flags Israel’s systemic discrimination against Palestinians in the West Bank and says it is violating international law on racial segregation and apartheid.
It is difficult to imagine that the utter lack of hope that is being imposed will not prompt a counter-reaction. What, where, and when are all open questions.
Undeniably, what happens in Palestine has ripple effects in the rest of the world – from the debasement of international law and the advent of new, hyperpoliticised approaches to aid to disillusionment and festering anger with an international order that has allowed, if not enabled, this all to happen.
Syria and Lebanon: Neighbours in Unstable Transition
The last year was one of monumental change for Syria, both internally and on the world stage. Interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa went from a sanctioned rebel leader with a $10 million bounty on his head to playing basketball with US military leaders and addressing the UN General Assembly – the first Syrian leader to do so since the al-Assad family came to power in the early 1970s.
Inside Syria, people are coming back home after 14 years of war and exile; the UN says 1.2 million returned to Syria in 2025 from neighbouring countries, alongside 1.9 internally displaced people.
But al-Assad’s swift ouster and sanctions relief has not resolved all the problems Syrians are facing, and it has unravelled some new ones: Many people don’t have access to reliable healthcare or water and sanitation, the number of people killed and injured by landmines and other unexploded remnants of war is rising as people return home, and the country’s longrunning economic crises has not abated enough to make things easier for the 90% of Syrians who live in poverty.
The coming year will be both fragile and crucial for Syria, with ongoing attacks against religious minorities and eruptions of violence threatening stability and successful transition and reconciliation, alongside the potential threat of what is left of the so-called Islamic State.
More than 7 million people are still internally displaced, some from recent violence, and tens of thousands have fled to neighbouring Lebanon.
Despite a late 2024 ceasefire that ended a war that killed some 4,000 people in Lebanon, Israel has continued to regularly bomb the country, killing a reported 127 civilians in the year following the truce. Many fear a return to all-out conflict, but, even if that doesn’t happen, the uncertainty of waiting for the next round of war can take a serious mental toll. With Israeli occupation of some parts of the south and the airstrikes, plus a deteriorating health system, poverty, and a lack of reconstruction, it all adds up to an ongoing crisis that should not be overlooked.
South Sudan: A Pivotal Verdict Looms
A lot hangs on a trial underway in a special court in Juba’s Freedom Hall: Riek Machar, South Sudan’s First Vice President and long-standing thorn in the government’s side, is accused of terrorism, treason, and crimes against humanity.
A conviction could mark the end of the already fragile 2018 peace agreement between Machar and President Salva Kiir that ended five years of war. The charges against Machar – along with seven senior colleagues – relate to a March attack on a military base in Nasir, the heartland of Machar’s opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/In-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).
The ideal trial outcome for Kiir would be a conviction, followed by a magnanimous pardon – if Machar agrees to political retirement.
But with the case seen by many as clearly weaponised, the country is increasingly tense. Clashes between the army and SPLM-IO have intensified, with Machar’s forces forming alliances with other insurgent groups. The government has responded with indiscriminate air strikes.
Kiir is comfortable with an opposition in the bush rather than as a power-sharing partner. It allows him to pursue a patronage-based scorched-earth counter-insurgency strategy. But the humanitarian impact has been huge. More than nine million people are in need out of a population of 12 million. Food insecurity is critical: the economy, dependent on oil exports through Sudan, is in deep trouble.
Kiir, with an eye on his succession, has also purged senior members of his own party – adding to the instability. Nevertheless, he is pushing for elections in 2026, without agreed institutional reforms in place. Rather than cementing his rule, that’s likely to only worsen the instability.
Haiti: Risky Foreign Interventions and Tentative Elections
Raging violence, severe food insecurity, and an unprecedented level of displacement continue to set the trend in Haiti. Gangs, who already control most of the capital, Port-au-Prince, are expanding into surrounding departments, hindering access to economic opportunities, and disrupting the provision of goods and vital aid.
The worsening crisis has now displaced more than 1.4 million Haitians and left nearly half the population of about 12 million in acute food insecurity. At least 4,388 people were killed due to gang violence between January and September 2025, and rates of sexual and gender-based violence rose by 34% over a similar period compared to the year before. Children have been left without schooling and are increasingly recruited by armed groups, while access to basic services and healthcare is severely limited.
Aid has dwindled due to funding cuts and access issues, as the international community continues to offer the same kind of foreign interventions that have long failed to bring meaningful solutions for Haitians.
Confronted with the failure of the UN-approved (MSS) stabilisation mission deployed since 2024 to rein in the gangs, the UN Security Council authorised its transition into a 5,500-strong Gang Suppression Force last September. Its broader mandate has raised significant concern that its deployment could drive up civilian casualties. So far, 18 countries have pledged to contribute troops, but funding remains largely insufficient.
Adding to the volatility, the Haitian government is using Vectus Global, a private security company led by controversial US military contractor Erik Prince, to operate drones that have already killed dozens.
On the political side, the risk of a power vacuum looms, as the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council ends on 7 February, with little detail on how governance is supposed to work until Haiti’s first elections in a decade – tentatively slated for August and December 2026 – can be held.
Ethiopia and Eritrea: A Port Spat with Far Wider Implications
There was talk all through 2025 of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but heading into 2026 the likelihood is edging closer.
In its simplest terms, the tension is about a port. Landlocked Ethiopia wants one, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is fixated on Assab – ignoring it has been Eritrean territory since independence in 1993. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki, unsurprisingly, rejects handing it over.
Between these two contending powers is Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray. It remains devastated from the 2020-2022 war between the federal government, backed by Eritrea, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
But peace has created a schism within the TPLF over relations with Abiy. The TPLF’s old guard – which runs the regional administration – feels threatened by a group of Tigrayan reformers they regard as too pro-Addis Ababa. The TPLF leadership has cosied up to Eritrea, despite Asmara’s well-documented war atrocities. The dissidents, in turn, have created a new party and a militia – the Tigray Peace Force (TPF). In clashes with the TPLF, Addis Ababa has provided the TPF with drone support – to the fury of the regional administration.
The worsening tensions suits Eritrea: They would prefer to see Abiy’s army tied up in a renewed Tigray slugfest rather than crossing its southern border. But a proxy conflict can be hard to contain.
There is also a new and dangerous regional dimension. Although Abiy’s quixotic port quest has rattled neighbours, he has the backing of the UAE. In return, Ethiopia provides logistical support and a training base to Sudan’s UAE-sponsored RSF. Afwerki sides with the rival Sudanese army and has his own regional friends. They include Egypt, which has labelled Ethiopia an existential threat, and takes a dim view of any potential Ethiopian naval presence on the strategic Red Sea. These are all combustible ingredients for a possible wider conflict.
Democratic Republic of the Congo: From Conflict to Long-Term M23 Occupation
The Rwanda-backed M23 armed group is poised to remain a central driver of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2026, after its most significant territorial and political gains to date.
The group seized control of the region’s largest cities last year, entrenching a parallel administration that signals ambitions for a long-term occupation. That spells disaster for the millions of Congolese living under M23 rule, who face daily abuses ranging from forced labour and extrajudicial killings to land seizures and deportations.
There has been some movement on mediation. Last month, Donald Trump brought the Congolese and Rwandan presidents together to sign a peace deal. But Trump’s claim to be “settling a war that’s been going on for decades” looks detached from reality as intense fighting has displaced roughly half a million people in just the past few weeks.
The M23 is meanwhile engaged in separate talks with Kinshasa in Doha, but sincerity is lacking on all sides. Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi may face fierce local backlash were he to grant major concessions to the deeply unpopular rebels, while the M23 and its Rwandan patrons continue to profit from the war.
Having initially justified its insurgency by accusing Kinshasa of breaching an earlier peace deal and claiming to protect Tutsi communities, the M23 has since adopted far wider demands. It now frames its struggle in terms of broader governance failure and has called for a federal system that would allow it to rule autonomously.
And it should be noted that the M23 is only one of more than 100 armed groups operating in eastern DRC, which is a key frontier of global capitalist extraction. Nationwide, more than seven million people are internally displaced.
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The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world. Find out more at www.thenewhumanitarian.org.
